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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

:

STEVE HARRIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020337-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Aggravated Burglary,
a first-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (2000) together with a oneyear weapon enchantment. On March 28, 2002, Judge Michael D. Lyon signed an
entry of judgment, sentence and commitment sentencing the Defendant to serve a
term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison together with a one-year sentence
on the weapon enhancement to run consecutively.

On April 23, 2002, the

Defendant filed a notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp.
2001).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DDD THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT BY
REFERRING TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WASN'T
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING THEIR VERDICT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial. See, State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925,
927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because the issue was not raised with the trial court it
should be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the
existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists,
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant..." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
POINT II
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND
TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
CAUSTIC LIQUID INJESTED BY HIS DAUGHTER?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance
of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was
ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
POINT III
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT
OCCURRED DURING HIS TRIAL?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether the
cumulative effect of the errors during the trial deprived the Defendant a fair trial.
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 'the cumulative effect
of the several errors undermines our confidence .... ..that a fair trial was had.'"
State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000)(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d
262, 277 (Utah 1998)).
3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
4

Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases.
Utah Code Annotated
76-5-203
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another and thereby causes the death of another;
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 802 Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 11th 2001, in the early morning hours an individual broke a window,
and came into the apartment of the victim in this case Alicia Harris.

The

individual proceeded to savagely beat Ms. Harris with a bat or similar object,
causing several injuries including a broken hand, a lacerated skull, and extensive
bruising. The victim believed that the individual was her estranged husband, and
directed police to his house. The police eventually arrested the defendant for this
offense and he was charged with Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony, a
weapons enhancement, and Aggravated Assault, which was later dismissed. The
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Burglary with a weapons enhancement by
a jury.

On March 25, 2002 the Honorable Michael D. Lyon sentenced the

Defendant to serve a term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. On April
23, 2002, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony.
The Defendant pled not guilty to the charge and a jury trial was held with the
Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding on January 14, 15, 16,and 17, 2002. The
jury found the Defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary together with the weapon
enhancement.

6

The evidence presented to the jury showed that on the day of the offense, the
victim lived at 1325 Lincoln Avenue #112, in Ogden, Utah. (R 167/ page 32) The
victim filed for divorce from the Defendant and had the locks changed on the home
on March 2, 2000. (R 167/ page 34) They had attempted to mediate the divorce on
May 7, 2000, but did not resolve the custody issue. (R 167/ page 36)
The victim, Alicia Harris, testified that in the early morning hours of May
11, 2000, as she was getting out of the shower, there was an individual standing
dressed in a black sweatshirt standing in her bedroom. (R 167/ page46) The
individual had on a black full-faced knit ski mask with one mouth and two eye
holes. (R 167/ page 84) The individual had a bat or bat like object and struck Alicia
in the head and then savagely beat her on the head and back. She required stitches
to close a wound on her head. (R 167/ page 47) The victim believed that the
individual was the Defendant because of his height and size. (R 167/ page 50) She
also recognized some white Reebok tennis shoes with a blue stripe and black jeans,
which were the same type that the Defendant owned. (R 167/ page 53) The victim
could not determine the assailant's eye color, hair color, and never heard the
assailant speak. (R 167/ page 97) The assailant was not wearing glasses, and the
victim acknowledged that the Defendant would have a hard time seeing without his
glasses. (R 167/page 98)
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After the police arrived, the victim told one of the officers that "one good
thing that will come from this incident is that I will get custody of the children." (R
167/ page 110) After the victim was taken to the hospital, one of the officers
handed the defendant's daughter a Gatorade bottle that was on the floor of the
bedroom. The daughter, Mikaela, drank the liquid and began screaming and
holding her ears. (R 168/ page 21) Later at the hospital the police question the
daughter, Mikaela, about the beating and are told that the assailant was not her
daddy. (R 168/page 233)
Shortly after arriving at the victims' house, the police request other officers
to go to the Defendant's house. When they arrived one of the officers hears the
Defendant's car making popping sounds, as though it had recently been driven. (R
168/ 41) The police arrest the Defendant and ask him if they can search his car, to
which he consents. They found a black wool knit hat, a blue and white bandana,
and a pair of white, blue and yellow Reebok running shoes. (R 168/42) They also
search his home but did not find a black knit ski mask with eyeholes and a mouth
hole, nor did they find a bat or club. (R 168/ page 52) The Defendant was wearing
the white Reeboks with a blue stripe that became one of the exhibits at trial. One of
the officers, at the time of trial recalled seeing a black sweatshirt in the
Defendant's bedroom, although he never put that fact into any police report, nor
did they ever obtain a search warrant to retrieve it. (R 168/ page 68 & 70) The

8

police then began asking the Defendant some questions about his whereabouts. He
originally tells them he had gone to the Chevron store on 12 and Harrison one
hour earlier. (R 168/ page 49) The police go to that store and discover that it was
closed at the time of the incident. (R 168/ page 57) They then check the other
Chevron that the Defendant tells them he may have been to at 12th and Washington
and find a video surveillance tape that does not ever show the Defendant at that
store. (R 168/ page 55) The Defendant later claimed to have gone to a Chevron on
21 st and Harrison to buy a Diet Coke. (R 169/143)
The police examine the Defendant and find no scratches or injuries, (R 168/
page 124) and the glass taken from his car did not match that of the window
broken at the scene by the assailant to gain entry into the home. (R 169 page 68)
The police obtained three blood samples at the area around the broken window, but
failed to match any to the Defendant. (R 169/ page 15) The police obtained a
search warrant for the Defendant's car, and found a bottle of Red Devil Lye. The
crime lab analyzed this Red Devil Lye and compared it to the substance taken out
of the Gatorade bottle. Both samples contained sodium hydroxide, the chemical in
many brands of drain cleaners. (R 169/ page 62) The Defendant testified and
denied any involvement in the crime.
Following the jury deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as
charged.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah guarantee a
criminal defendant the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. One of those due
process guarantees is that the State's representative, the prosecutor, will conduct a
trial that is fair, right and just. In the present case the prosecutor crossed that line to
the detriment of the defendant. Through careful manipulation of the evidence the
prosecutor put before the jury a series of witnesses whose inflammatory
testimonies were so prejudicial that it jeopardized the impartiality of the jury. In
this case, not only was the victim Alicia Harris savagely beaten, but after the crime
an unwitting officer gave the Defendant's daughter a bottle of caustic liquid, the
ingestion of which caused severe damage. Although the Defendant was never
charged with this offense, the prosecutor made sure that the jury heard and was
reminded time and again the improper insinuation that this was the Defendant's
responsibility.
What was even more insidious was a dramatic re-enactment that the
prosecutor left to the rebuttal closing. This carefully choreographed performance
was engineered with information that was not ever entered into evidence, and was
paraded before the jury at a time that the prosecutor could ensure that the
Defendant could not correct the damage.
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This was a case where the proof of guilt was not strong. There was little if
any physical evidence that tied the Defendant to the crime. The conviction hinged
upon the eyewitness testimony of a victim who made the all important
identification solely on the height and stature of the assailant. She did not see the
assailant's face nor hear his voice. He did not wear glasses, yet the Defendant was
blind without them. The dark jeans and white Reebok shoes that assisted in the
identification were not distinctive, but rather extremely common. The sodium
hydroxide that was found at the scene was analyzed only to the extent of narrowing
it down to dozens of possible products available in any grocery or hardware store.
And even the Defendant's contradictory accounts of his whereabouts did little to
shore up a weak case. In truth it was an unconvincing case with questionable
evidence. It was the type of case that encourages a prosecutor to cross the line of
justice.
Unfortunately it was also a case where the defense counsel failed to object to
conduct that was not only obvious, but was also detrimental to the Defendant. This
failing of counsel resulted in the Defendant being denied his rights to effective
counsel, his right to an impartial jury and his right to due process in a fair trial as
guaranteed by the constitutions of this State and this Country.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE PROSECUTOR
COMMIT MISCONDUCT
BY
REFERRING TO MATTERS WHICH THE JURY WASN'T
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN DETERMING THEIR VERDICT?
During the course of the trial, the prosecutor made inquiry into evidence
which was improper. Furthermore, in closing argument, the prosecutors engaged in
acting out a scene, which was highly inflammatory and obviously improper. These
statements and actions amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because "the remarks
call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict. . ." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261
(Utah 1988).

Furthermore, these comments were extremely prejudicial.

The

statements which constitute prosecutorial misconduct are outlined below.
A.
The prosecutor made comments throughout the trial regarding
the ingestion of caustic liquid by the Defendant's daughter.
During the prosecutor's opening statement he referred to a Gatorade bottle
that contained sodium hydroxide, that among other things is commonly used as a
drain cleaner. On the day of the offense, one of the officers at the scene saw the
bottle sitting on the floor of the bedroom and gave it to the Defendant's daughter,
Mikaela. She then drank the liquid causing severe damage to her throat. The
prosecutor elicited evidence from several witnesses during the trial on this subject
and repeatedly referred to this unfortunate incident in his closing argument,
12

inferring that the Defendant was responsible for the act. No charge was ever
brought forth against the Defendant for this occurrence.
B.

The prosecutors engaged in an inappropriate acting out of a

drama during rebuttal closing arguments.
During rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor, Mr. Heward, put on a
carefully choreographed display. He asked the jury to close their eyes, and "place
[themselves] in [the victims] shoes."(R170/51) He then commenced an outrageous
experiment with the jury. He stated "It's the early morning hours of the 11th of
May. You've gone in, you've taken a shower. Lights off in your bedroom. Come
out of the shower. Lights on behind you. You move toward the open doorway of
your bedroom. It's not lighted. The only light's coming from behind you. And as
you come around the comer, you see a shadow. You hit the switch."
During this shocking narrative, while the jury's eyes are closed. Prosecutor
Smith put on the knit hat and carefully positioned the scarf around his lower face,
and then stood before the jury waiting for their eyes to open1. Mr. Heward then
told the jury . "You hit the switch. Or for this case, you open your eyes. What do
you see in front of you? Do you see a knit ski mask with two eyeholes and a mouth
hole or teeth? What do you see?"(Rl 70/51,52 emphasis added)

1

See Addendum B, photos from the video of rebuttal closing depicting the
prosecutors' actions.
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At no time during the evidence portion of the trial did the prosecutor ever
elicit testimony from the victim as to the possibility that the ski mask with the eye
and mouth hole could have been the knit cap and scarf. This drama was saved for
rebuttal closing, when the defense had no opportunity to rebut this display.
The 5 and 6 Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well
as Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah guarantees that all
criminal defendants shall be guaranteed due process of law, which is the
embodiment of a fair trial. The Supreme Court in the case of Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) held:
"It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process
Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so
deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole
history. Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just."2
Further, the Court has observed that "[d]ue process is violated if a practice
or rule 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '"Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97,105(1934).
One of the basics of this principle of justice is that the prosecutor in a
criminal case is held to a higher standard than a mere advocate. The prosecutor

2

Dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter
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has taken an oath to uphold justice, and to shun any actions that could jeopardize
fairness.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). Held:
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.,f
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has likewise observed the special position
a prosecutor holds when it stated:
"Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above
those of privately employed attorneys. As former Chief Justice
Gordon Hall, himself a prosecutor prior to assuming the bench,
observed in Emmett, (supra) '[PJrosecutors have a duty to eschew all
improper tactics."1 State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 961(Utah 1999)
Prosecutorial misconduct can occur in various manners and can take a
variety of forms. The Court, in the case of State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, held,
"We will reverse a jury verdict because of prosecutorial misconduct if we find the
prosecutor's remarks were improper and harmful to defendant." In a long line of
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cases the Appellate Courts of the State of Utah, have closely examined
prosecutors' actions in criminal trials, and reversed those convictions, which were
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. A review of some of those cases follows.
In State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999) the court reversed a
conviction of sexual abuse of a child where there were several errors including
prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court was particularity careful in examining

prosecutorial misconduct in cases where proof of guilt is not strong. "Once again
we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above those of privately
employed attorneys." {Id. 961)
In the case of State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) the Court examined
questions and statements of the prosecutor and found obvious error. The Court
noted, "The insinuation that other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine
its verdict based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's
right to a trial based upon the evidence presented. The prosecutor's remarks and his
questions asked of Detective Couch constituted obvious error." {Id. at 349)
Although the Court found prosecutorial misconduct to be error, they deemed the
error harmless due to the overwhelming admissible evidence produced elsewhere
in the trial. "When there is strong proof of guilt, the conduct or remark of a
prosecutor is not presumed prejudicial. Therefore, unless the error undermines our
confidence in the jury verdict, we will not overturn that verdict." {Id. at 349)
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In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) the court found plain error in a
prosecutions comments in closing argument. In commenting on Emmett's forgery
conviction, the prosecutor noted that the victim of the crime was Emmett's sister.
Stating that Emmett is n[s]ome one who took advantage of his own family
member," the prosecutor declared, "Well, he did it again." {Id. at 786) In that case
the court found that the evidence of guilt in the remainder of the trial was not
strong, and therefore reversed the conviction of sodomy of a child.
The Supreme Court likewise found prosecutorial misconduct in the case of
State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986) In that case the prosecutor asked
defendant in cross examination about additional felonies (the defendant had
admitted to three felony convictions on direct examination) inferring he had others.
The defendant denied other convictions and the prosecutor never offered any
evidence of other convictions. The court however affirmed the conviction ruling
that "[I]n view of the evidence adduced and the instructions given, and the fact that
defendant did admit to three prior convictions for burglary, we cannot say that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been any
different in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct." {Id. at 770)
In one of the most cited cases regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the Court
reversed the conviction of the defendant in the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483
(Utah 1984). In that case, the court found prosecutorial misconduct where the

17

prosecutor referred to the defendant's legal name change as an alias, where the
prosecutor claimed the defendant was under a federal witness identity program,
and also inferred that the defendant was involved in various criminal matters. In
closing statement, the prosecutor compared the defendant to Hinkley and asked the
jury f,[U]se your experience, and in talking to one another, don't put your common
sense aside. If you have been involved in a situation, speak up, talk about it,
deliberate it." (Id. at 486) The court found prosecutorial misconduct in holding :
In this case, there was not compelling proof of defendant's guilt.
The jury could have found either way. Consequently, we are
compelled to find that the second step of the Valdez test has been met.
The jurors "probably were influenced by" the remarks of the
prosecutor. While the trial court properly attempted to correct the
errors, the potential for harm, the probability for harm, and the
continued efforts of the prosecutor were too flagrant to be corrected.
(Id. at 487)

In the case of State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme
Court found that the prosecutors reference to the defendant's receiving income
while on social security as "double dipping" and "a cancer on society", signing
paychecks as "forging of signatures" and "filing for bankruptcy as an indication of
dishonesty" constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The court held, "[u]nder the
circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that the prosecutor's 'remarks called to
the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in considering . . .
[and that they] were probably influenced by the remarks.'" (Id. at 51) The Court
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found that the prosecutor's conduct v-- improper , ai i- i

011M kwc constituted

grounds for a new trial if they had not reversed the convictions for insufficiency of
the evidence.
In State i \ Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) the Court reversed the
conviction of aggravated robbery on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. In

h firanda silence,, botl I di irii ig exam of witnesses as w ell as closii lg

The Coi irt

held;
"Even if it could be validly argued that defendant's objection and the
court's attempt i cure the matter by striking and admonition were
effective, this cannot be said about prosecutor's comments during his
final argument. The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put the
defendant's silence before the jury after his having been advised of his
right to remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. The
references to defendant's silence are fundamental error, which could
have affected the result and are therefore prejudicial." (Id. at 147)
In the case of Walker v. State, 624 P 2r* £?-* a r tn u 10S1* the Court was
presented w ith a case n: \\ r.:,. . iae prosecutor w u;i.>..j exculpatory evidence from.

things he knew were incorrect. The court found prosecutorial misconduct and
reversed the conviction. There was no objection since this evidence was discovered
by the defense after trial.
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Finally, in the case of State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), the Utah
Supreme Court established a test for determining prosecutorial misconduct. "The
test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering in determining their
verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks." Id. at 426.
In the case at bar, the first part of the test is met. "[D]id the remarks call to
the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict. . ." Id.
The Defendant does not need to show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor
to show prosecutorial misconduct. "In Troy, we did not suggest that bad faith need
be shown. All that is necessary, according to Troy, is that 'the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict and that the remarks rise to the level of prejudicial error."
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984)).
In the present case there is no question that the prosecutor called to the
"attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict." During the course of testimony the prosecutor never
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asked the victim if the ski mask with eyeholes and a mouth hole could have been
the knit cap with the scarf tied around the face. He carefully saved this "new
evidence" for the rebuttal portion of the closing argument when the defense could
not refute it.

Mikaela, did not assist the ji iry in their deliberations, but rather prejudiced the ji liy
in their decision making process.
When deciding whether the second part of the test is met an appellate court
should consick. „ -
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me evidence concerning a defendant5s guilt, ^ec, Mate v.

l' ' '

:
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consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt.").
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark
will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof,
tl: lis C()i u 1: w ill i i 101 e closel) scrutii lize tl le coi ldi ict ' " t \ i ( Stations omitted).

weak. There is no physical evidence that puts the Defendant at the scene. There is
no confession, or eyewitness testimony that positively identifies the Defendant as
the perpetrator. The evidence of the trial can be reduced into three areas. First, the
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victim believed the assailant was the Defendant. She came to this belief by the
size, build and stature of the attacker, and by the fact that the attacker wore white
Reebok shoes. She also came to this belief based on her opinion that he had
motive. Second, the Defendant was confused regarding his whereabouts at the time
of the incident. The police arrived at his home shortly after the crime, and found
his car hood to be extremely hot, and the Defendant's statements as to his actions
in the past hour were contradicted by the police investigation. Finally, the police
found in the Defendant's car the knit cap and scarf already discussed, and a bottle
of Red Devil Lye with a basic ingredient of sodium hydroxide, the same basic
ingredient as the substance in the Gatorade bottle.
These three areas do not rise to the level of being conclusive. The size, build
and stature of the attacker describes an individual of average height and weight,
which fits the descriptions of thousands of people in Weber County. The Reebok
shoes the victim described are similar to some the Defendant owned, as well as
similar to some she owned (R 167/ page 118), and consistent with some owned by
millions of people. The motive claim is questionable since being caught in this
type of attack would be the last thing an individual who is in a custody battle
would want. The predictable result occurred in this case when the Defendant was
prohibited from further seeing the children. The Defendant's accounting of his
whereabouts, although confusing, are not conclusive of guilt. The scarf and knit
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cap do not equate to a ski mask with eye and mouth holes, and the substance in the
Gatorade bottle, although consistent with the Red Devil Lye, is also consistent with
numerous other substances.
Regarding the issue of the introduction of the ingestion of the caustic

crimes cannot be i lsed for at 1 ii npropei pi lrpose
In State v. Jones, 585 P.2d 445 (Utah 1978), the Court held that "evidence of
other crimes Is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a
person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have
committed the crime charged.

/u -t-f<>u nations omitted).
:
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crimes, wrongs or acts is uui admissible to prove the character c • : v - to show action in conformity therewith." In State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah
1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated;
Anchoring i:•,v. principle that prior crime evidence is not
admissible to show criminal propensity is the more fundamental
principle that a prosecutor may never argue or suggest to the finder of
fact, either directly or indirectly, that a defendant should be convicted
because of his criminal character or that he was guilty of the crime
charged because he acted in accord with a criminal propensity shown
by such evidence. This is true regardless of whether that evidence was
properly or erroneously admitted. A prosecutor who intentionally calls
to jurors' attention matters that they should not consider in reaching a
verdict is clearly guilty of misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor
argues prior bad acts or prior criminal conduct as a basis foi
convicting. Id :\\ Kt5(l
23

The repeated reference to the damage done to the daughter was clearly an
attempt to call the jury's a highly inflammatory and unfortunate occurrence, and an
attempt to lay that at the feet of the Defendant. The prosecutor called the jurors
attention to the matter and it was a matter which the jury was not justified in
considering.
Although the Defendant's attorney didn't object to the evidence it was
clearly plain error for this evidence to be admitted. A defendant must show the
following to establish plain error, "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.. ." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
POINT II
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND
TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
CAUSTIC LIQUID INJESTED BY HIS DAUGHTER?
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
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U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, (V- < "QS4

o <

established a two-part test to determine whether t't.iinsd"-, iissistarnv w\^
ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient, This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
ui. filing as the 'counsel5 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

^ ji

Defense counsel's m<>r. tliiuii Juiul tin lti,il vaii mm
allowed the State lu introduce inflammatory statements of seven! \\i"v--.regarding the daughters drinking of the contents of the Gatorade bottle. The
prosecutor made several inappropriate statements throughout the trial which were
.*e statements are addressed under Point i ui ibis briet
Hit lln;il ;iikl hunt

JHY

iiidici.il l.iiluii ol tleliiisi unii^d

object to the inappropriate antics of :iv pros- -*.
failing to request a mistrial after being surprised

U<IS

m lulling to

<
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demonstration.
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland i> "the
• *e-V'\ '

.

requires showing that

I
."-"*-••

<:..:: ... preiuu.ceu uiw detente. I iiis
*

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. U t^h>'»*"> » -if>*
687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
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In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account
such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id.
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in
the outcome of the trial.
POINT III
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS
ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS TRIAL?
Even if all of the errors were individually harmless, they were cumulatively
harmful.

Under the cumulative error doctrine this Court should reverse the
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Defendant's conviction. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, \
only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . .
that a fair trial was had." State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 1 " , > S6 (Utah 2000).
1 he errors in the Defendant's trial were numerous.. They started during the
•.i

. rebuttal portion of the State' s

referred to evidence during the closing statement, which was not presented Auvuw
the trial The comments during the opening statement and throughout the trial were
very prejudicial against the Defendant. The repeated uncharged allegation that the
Defendant ....

Liu;^,:

tremendous physical injury -» iiis own daughter permeated

1

objec •—

•,...'._

*•

defense in not

.. :

Defendant did nui receive a fair trial. 1 oi this reason, tnc conviction should be
reversed and the Defendant should be granted a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Tin1 DdiTidunfs i/tMisliliiljoiu! iHil lo „f hi! lu.il n as, lepeatctilv uolutcd
through out the trial. The individual /'»rt - r e-u

• • •-

-\

prejudiced the Defendant. The cumulative effect of the many errors was that the
Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial Ft>r these reasons, the
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Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand
his case back to the trial court so he can receive a fair trial.
DATED this^JPiay of January, 2J

Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Fred
Voros, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this^Oday of
January, 2003.

>HARON SIP
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - QGDEN COURT'"
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Jill! 1 1 NUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMEN T

COMMITMENT

vs.
STEVE HARRIS,
Defendant,

y :HAEL D. LYON
March 25, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindaf
Prosecutor: DEE WILLIAM SMITH
GARY HEWARD
Defendan t
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN T

CAINE

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 21, 1973
Video
Tape Number:
L32502
Tape Count: 9:57
CHARGES
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degrc .,
- Disposition: 01/27/2002 Guilt}
HEARING

This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present with
counsel John Cai ne
State is represented by Dee Smith and Gary
Heward.

Court denies the motior
the following sentence.

ieduce the conviction.

Page 1

Court imposes
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Case No: 011902247
Date:
Mar 25, 2002
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison7frfl/fcd9U. Vt^j^OA^S
UAJL ^ (K iCu^OMQ^
[Jbfa&U\*
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison,where the
defendant will be confined.
'

Dated t h i s

£/T7 day of

\*M}\l ^ , 2OQ6L

Mm

LYON
District Court Judde

MICHAELDT

Page 2 (last)
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